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EWA DĄBROWSKA* 
 
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that speakers store large numbers of 
preconstructed phrases and low-level patterns, even when these can be derived from more 
abstract constructions, and that ordinary language use relies heavily on such relatively 
concrete, lexically specific units rather than abstract rules or schemas that apply “across the 
board”. One of the advantages of such an approach is that it provides a straightforward 
explanation of how grammar can be learned from the input; and in fact, previous work (e.g. 
Dąbrowska and Lieven 2005) has demonstrated that the utterances children produce can be 
derived by superimposing and juxtaposing lexically specific units derived directly from 
utterances that they had previously experienced. This paper argues that such a “recycling” 
account can also explain adults’ ability to produce complex fluent speech in real time, and 
explores the implications of such a view for theories of language representation and 
processing. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
An adequate cognitive theory of language must be able to account for its three basic 
properties: productivity, or our ability to produce and understand an indefinite number of 
novel utterances; learnability, or the fact that language learners are able to acquire this ability 
from a finite number of utterances that they are exposed to; and, last but not least, real-time 
processing: the fact that we are able to process complex messages very quickly, even in 
conditions which are far from ideal. In ordinary conversation, English-speaking adults 
produce, on average, 210 words per minute (Tauroza and Allison 1990); the average gap 
between turns is about 500 msec (Bull and Aylett 1998). Thus, within half of a second of the 
first speaker finishing her turn, the interlocutor has interpreted the speakers’ utterance, 
decided on an appropriate response, formulated it, and launched an appropriate motor 
programme to begin his own contribution. Since conversational turns often overlap, it is clear 
that much of this processing happens while the second speaker is still listening. To make 
things worse, ordinary conversation often contains sentence fragments and false starts, as 
well as some ungrammatical sentences, and the acoustic signal is often distorted or partially 
inaudiblei. Yet speakers and listeners are not fazed by this, and are able to communicate with 
each other reasonably effectively, with only occasional misunderstandings. 
 The generative tradition in linguistics has emphasized productivity, and failed on the 
other two criteria. Chomsky explicitly acknowledges that a generative grammar is 
unlearnable from the input – hence the need for an innate Universal Grammar (which, as 
Dąbrowska under review argues – is an extremely problematic concept). Most generative 
linguists have little interest in processing, which is regarded as part of “performance”, and the 
linguistic models developed in this framework are computationally intractable and not easily 
accommodated in a processing theory (which would have to explain how people go from 
meaning to sound and vice versa). 
Usage-based cognitive models, in contrast, can accommodate all three desiderata. 
They can explain productivity by appealing to constructional schemas (Langacker 1987, 
2000) and offer a straightforward account of how children extract schemas from the language 
that they hear (see Dąbrowska 2000; Diessel 2004; Lieven et al. 2009; Tomasello 2003), thus 
fulfilling the learnability requirement. Last but not least, they can also explain how speakers 
process language in real time. This aspect of the theory has not been developed in much 
detail, however, and will therefore be the main focus of this paper. 
 In usage-based cognitive models (Barlow and Kemmer 2000; Bybee 2010; Goldberg 
2006; Langacker 2000) linguistic knowledge is represented by a network of form-meaning 
pairings called constructions. Constructions vary in size and specificity: they can be simple or 
complex (i.e., consist of smaller subunits), and they can be concrete (phonologically specific) 
or schematic (partially or entirely underspecified). Idioms such as kick the bucket and 
formulaic phrases such as I like it are examples of complex concrete expressions; it is 
assumed that the latter are available as preconstructed units just like words of comparable 
frequencies.ii Complex schematic units include low-level schemas (or “frames with slots”) 
such as I like NP or NP1 like NP2, as well as more abstract units such as the transitive 
construction; crucially, even the highly abstract constructions are meaningful (cf. Langacker 
1987; Goldberg 1995). 
 Figure 1 presents schematic diagrams of three types of complex units: a formulaic 
phrase, a low-level schema and an abstract schema. The diagram loosely follows the 
conventions developed by Langacker: the large boxes at the top and at the bottom represent 
semantic and phonological structure respectively, while the smaller boxes represent 
substructures within these complex units, and the vertical lines, symbolic relationships. The 
abbreviations ‘tr’ and ‘lm’ stand for ‘trajector’ (loosely, “subject”) and ‘landmark’ (“object”), 
the arrow represents a ‘process’, or temporal relation (see Langacker 1987 for a full 
exposition and explanation of these terms). Crucially, all three types of units have the same 
overall structure, and differ only in specificity (cf. Dąbrowska 2000; Langacker 1987); thus, 
the transition from formula to schema does not require translation into a different 
representational format, but merely loss of detail. To acquire a complex schematic unit, a 
learner must be able to do three things: (1) represent the phonological and semantic properties 
of utterances; (2) segment utterances and match chunks of phonology with chunks of 
semantic structure (e.g. work out that the phonological chunk /laik/ in Figure 1b corresponds 
to the relationship between the ‘liker’ and the ‘liked’); and (3) form slots by generalising over 
fillers attested in a particular frame (i.e., observe that the first slot in the frame NP1 like NP2 
is filled with a referring expression designating the “liker”, while the second slot corresponds 
to the “thing liked”). Note that relational words such as verbs or prepositions are effectively 
low-level schemas like the one represented in Figure 1b (see Dąbrowska 2009 for further 
discussion). We know that different languages lexicalise relational concepts very differently 
(Bowerman 1996; Dąbrowska 2004; Sinha et al. 1994), and hence children must be able to 
acquire such representations from the input available to them. One of the great advantages of 
the usage-based cognitive approach is that it can explain grammatical development without 
assuming any mental abilities over and above those which are necessary for lexical learning 
(see Tomasello 2003). 
Thus, according to the usage-based approach, constructions are acquired by 
generalising over specific exemplars. Specific constructions are, from a developmental point 
of view, more basic than abstract ones. Later in this paper, I will argue that this is also the 
case from the point of view of adult production and comprehension: speakers prefer more 
concrete units, and use them whenever they can. Finally, the usage-based approach assumes 
that constructions become entrenched through repeated use: every use of a particular unit, 
whether in comprehension or production, strengthens it and increases the likelihood of its 
being used in the future. Thus, other things being equal, more frequent expressions are more 
likely to be available as units, and more likely to be accessed during language processing. 
 
Figure 1: Types of complex units 
(a) a formulaic (fixed) phrase 
(b) a low level schema (“frame with slots”) 
(c) a general schema (“abstract construction”) 
 
 
 The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss some language 
acquisition studies which demonstrated that the vast majority of young children’s multiword 
utterances can be easily traced back to precedents in the language they had experienced, and 
that their syntactic productivity is best explained by assuming that they recombine lexically 
specific chunks derived from their experience. In Section 3, I review evidence that lexically 
specific chunks are also used by adults. The following two sections describe a case study 
examining the extent to which a particular adult’s conversational speech relies on such units. 
Section 6 provides a brief outline of a usage-based model of sentence production, and the 
concluding section discusses the implications of such view of production for theories of 
language structure. 
 
2. How children build sentences (and learn grammar in the process) 
 
 Dąbrowska and Lieven (2005) and Lieven et al. (2009) describe an application of the 
usage based approach to child language. Both studies begin with the observation that early 
child language is highly formulaic (cf. Lieven et al. 1997, 2003; Tomasello 2000), and 
attempt to explain children’s grammatical productivity in terms of lexically specific units 
derived from the input and simple operations on these units. Both studies analysed data for 
four children who had been recorded for 30 hours each at ages 2 and 3. Each of the resulting 
eight corpora was divided into two parts: the test corpus, which comprised the last, or the last 
two, transcripts, and the main corpus, which comprised the remaining transcripts. The child’s 
multiword utterances in the test corpus were then “traced back” to lexically specific units 
attested in the main corpus. It was reasoned that if this was possible, then the inventory of 
lexically-specific units derived from the main corpus could be said to capture the children’s 
syntactic knowledge at this stage of development. 
 The traceback analysis assumed two kinds of lexically specific units, fixed phrases 
and frames with slots. A fixed phrase was defined as a recurrent form-meaning combination; 
it was assumed that it was available to the child as a unit if it was attested at least two times 
in the main corpus, in either the child’s or an adult’s speech. (A frequency criterion of 2 may 
seem rather unrealistic: I return to this issue later. For now, the reader should bear in mind 
that the main corpora are relatively small samples of the children’s linguistic experience: 
about 1% in the case of the two-year-olds and about 0.5% in the case of the three-year-olds.) 
For instance, the following utterances from the Thomas 3 main corpus were regarded as 
evidence that the expression some milk was available to the child as a preconstructed unit. 
(Note that these are examples: there in total 13 tokens of some milk in the main corpus.) 
 
(1) *CHI: cornflake-s with some milk. 
*CHI: I want some milk. 
*CHI: I got some milk and orange juice here. 
*MOT: some milk . 
*MOT: well you can have some milk at bedtime . 
*MOT: would you like some milk on them , Thomas? 
 
 Frames are recurrent form-meaning combinations containing a “slot” into which 
novel material can be inserted. To qualify as a frame, an expression had to be attested in the 
main corpus at least twice, with at least two different fillers in the slot. For instance, the 
sentences in (2) are regarded as evidence for a buy some N frame, where the N slot is filled by 
any expression designating a quantity of things that can be bought. The main corpus 
contained 28 tokens of this phrase. The sentences in (3) are instances of the do you want to 
VP frame (attested 47 times), where the VP slot can is filled by an expression designating the 
proposed activity. For simplicity, I use traditional syntactic labels such as N and VP to 
identify the slots, but it is assumed that the categories are defined in semantic terms and are 
frame-specific (at least initially): that is to say, the class of fillers that are inserted into the 
slots in these two frames are “things that can be bought” and “activity you could do”. 
 
(2) *CHI: I buy some jelly+baby-s. 
*CHI: buy some sweet-s. 
*MOT: well we must buy some more cheese from the supermarket. 
*MOT: well you usually buy some little jelly # worm-s. 
*MOT: we set off in the morning for a quick walk to buy some milk and we went via 
Lynne and Ben and Charlotte-’s house ,, did-’nt we? 
*MOT: you-’re go-ing to buy some orange+juice and milk and post some letter-s? 
 
(3) *CHI: do you want to kiss this? 
*CHI: do you want to read my post+box? 
*MOT: do you want to do it ? 
*MOT: do you want to press the button? 
*INV: ah do you want to show me? 
*MOT: do you want to get to your toybox? 
 
 Lexically specific units can be combined using two “usage-based” operations, 
juxtaposition and superimposition. Juxtaposition involves the simple concatenation of two 
independent units; the relationship between the units is paratactic rather than syntactic, and 
they can occur in either order. This occurs most often with vocatives, parentheticals, and 
some adverbials. For example, if we juxtapose the fixed phrase where are you and the noun 
baby, we get where are you, baby? or baby, where are you?; juxtaposing where’s it gone and 
now results in where’s it gone now? or now where’s it gone? Superimposition involves the 
combination of a frame with another chunk in such a way that the corresponding elements are 
“fused”; this happens at the phonological level and the semantic level at the same time. The 
simplest case is illustrated in Figure 2, where the noun pteranodon elaborates the noun slot in 
the frame where’s the ….. (The resulting utterance, where’s the pteranodon? was produced by 
one of the three-year-olds.) Figure 3 shows the superimposition of two frames, get them AP 
and get NP ready; the corresponding elements are connected with dotted lines. (For the sake 
of simplicity, I use a simplified notation which does not show semantic and phonological 
structure separately, but it should be remembered that all the units shown are form-meaning 
pairings, and that the operations apply simultaneously at both levels.) The two frames are 
“superimposed” in such a way that them in the first frame elaborates the NP slot in the second 
frame, and the element ready from the second frame elaborates the AP slot in the first frame; 
the result of the superimposition is the novel expression get them ready. Superimposition can 
only apply when the filler has the properties required by the slot: an NP slot can be filled only 
by an expression referring to a “thing” (in the technical cognitive grammar sense – see 
Langacker 1987), an AP slot can only be filled by a word describing a property, and so on. 
 Note that the expression get them ready could also be derived by superimposing them 
over the NP slot in get NP ready or by superimposing ready over the AP slot in get them AP. 
However, Dąbrowska and Lieven assumed that the child would always use the largest 
available chunks – in this case, get them AP and get NP ready. This assumption was made for 
two reasons. First, it was hypothesized that using overlapping chunks would facilitate 
superimposition, since it would make it easier to see how the chunks “fit together”. Secondly, 
using larger chunks eliminates many errors of commission, particularly in cases involving 
government and agreement. For instance, if the child used the get NP ready frame and 
combined it with the pronoun they, the result would be ungrammatical, while using a larger 
chunk such as get them AP results in a grammatical structure. 
 
Figure 2: The superimposition of where's the N and pteranodon 
 
Figure 3: Superimposition of get them AP and get AP ready 
 
 To get a sense of how utterances can be constructed using these units and operations, 
consider the example in Figure 4, which shows how one of the target utterances, Squirrel, do 
you want to buy some milk (produced by Thomas at age 3) can be assembled by combining 
four chunks: do you want to VP (attested 47 times), buy some N (attested 28 times), some milk 
(attested 13 times), and squirrel (attested twice). The derivation involves two 
superimpositions and one juxtaposition; notice that these operations can apply in any order. 
 
 Figure 4: Derivation of Squirrel, do you want to buy some milk? 
 
Dąbrowska and Lieven (2005) and Lieven et al. (2009)  found that, at age 2, the 
majority of the children’s utterances were either zero-operation utterances (exact repetitions 
of something either the child or the mother had said at least twice before in the main corpus) 
or single-operation utterances (minimal modifications of previously experienced utterances). 
This was also true of three of the four children at age 3;0, although they were using more 2- 
and 3-operation utterances and in one child’s case also some 4-operation utterances. At both 
ages 84-100% of the children’s questions can be derived by using lexically-specific units 
attested in the main corpora. The remaining utterances were “fails”, i.e., unsuccessful 
derivations. Although fails could, in principle, be regarded as evidence for more abstract 
knowledge, there is good evidence that this is not the case. Dąbrowska and Lieven (2005) 
point out that the “fails” are no more complex than the successful derivations, yet much more 
likely to be ungrammatical, and argue that they are probably speech errors, one-off 
innovations, or simply sampling artefacts (the main corpus comprised only 0.5-1% of the 
children’s linguistic experience, and hence many expressions which were unattested in it 
could in fact have been available to the children as units). We can conclude, then, that young 
children’s syntactic creativity can be explained by assuming that they “recycle” memorized 
chunks. 
 
3. Holistic processing  in adults 
 
 We have seen that young children’s ability to produce sentences can be explained by 
assuming that they retrieve lexically specific chunks from memory and combine them using 
the operations described earlier. Could such a mechanism also account for adult productive 
abilities? 
 Following early demonstrations of the importance of preconstructed phrases by 
Sinclair (1991) and Pawley and Snyder (1983), several researchers have tried to determine 
what proportion of texts is made up of such units. One of the best-known studies by Erman 
and Warren (2000) found that prefabs constitute  59% of spoken discourse. However, this 
figure is probably an underestimate, since Erman and Warren counted only conventionalized 
word combinations, i.e., combinations that contained some sort of idiosyncrasy. Altenberg 
(1998) counted all recurrent word in the London-Lund corpus, and found that over 80% of 
the word tokens in the corpus were part of such combinations. Note that even this figure 
could be an underestimate, since their corpus was quite small (less than half a million words), 
and Altenberg only counted recurrent contiguous combinations (in other words, he did 
include prefabs with slots). 
 On the other hand, as many critics pointed out, the fact that a combination of words 
recurs does not necessarily entail that speakers store it. Recurrent word combinations 
consisting of frequent words such as of the or and it are not particularly interesting 
linguistically, and could arise purely by chance. However, there is growing evidence that 
speakers store large numbers of preconstructed phrases, including completely regular phrases 
(Cowie 1998; Ellis 1996; Siyanova-Chanturia and Martinez 2014; Weinert 2010; Wray 2002), 
and that these facilitate sentence comprehension and production: for instance, they are read 
faster (Arnon and Snider 2010; Conklin and Schmitt 2008; Tremblay et al. 2011; Siyanova-
Chanturia et al. 2011), produced more quickly (Tremblay and Tucker 2011) and more fluently 
(Dąbrowska 2008a; Kuiper 1996) and remembered better (Dąbrowska et al. 2009; Tremblay 
et al. 2011) than non-formulaic chunks. 
 Most researchers, however, continue to regard formulaic language as either a 
developmental phenomenon – a stage that learners go through before they become fully 
productive with the rules of a language – or as special mode of processing which 
complements the normal (i.e., analytic) mode. Thus, while juxtaposing and superimposing 
memorized chunks may work for young children, who produce short and relatively simple 
sentences, it does not appear to be a viable method of sentence production for adults, except 
in some special circumstances. Since the number of possible word combinations increases 
exponentially with sentence length, adults couldn’t possibly store enough units, or retrieve 
them when needed during real-time language processing. 
 Or could they? Human long-term memory has a vast storage capacity. Some 
researchers have even argued that, for all practical purposes, its storage capacity can be 
assumed to be infinite (cf. Barsalou 1992: 148; Schneider and Bjorklund 1998: 469; Standing 
1973), and that encoding into memory is “an obligatory, unavoidable consequence of 
attention” (Logan 1988: 493). This is perhaps most striking with visual stimuli. In a classical 
study by Shephard (1967), participants were shown each of 612 pictures for six seconds. 
When tested later using a two-alternative forced-choice recognition task, they were able to 
choose the correct picture 98% of the time. Standing (1973) used a similar method with much 
larger stimuli sets; but even when presented with 10,000 pictures, participants correctly 
recognized the seen pictures 83% of the time. 
 Memory for verbal stimuli appears to be less accurate than for pictures, but it is still 
impressive. A series of rigorous experiments recently conducted by Gurevich et al. (2010) 
demonstrates incidental verbatim memory for sentences in adults after a single exposure. 
Participants listened to one of two versions of a story and were then given a surprise 
recognition test. The stories were constructed in such a way that each sentence in version 1 
corresponded to a nearly synonymous sentence in version 2: for instance, It’s bedtime,” said 
Jesse corresponded to “Time for bed,” said Jesse. The sentences from the other version of the 
story were used as foils on the recognition task. Gurevich et al. found that, after a single 
exposure to the story, participants recognised sentences at above chance levels (60-73% 
correct), and were able to reproduce some of the sentences verbatim, even when tested a 
week later. 
 Another relevant source of evidence comes from studies which examined the corpus 
frequency of conventionalized multiword units such as idioms and proverbs. Because such 
units are, by definition, (at least partly) idiosyncratic, they must be stored, yet their text 
frequencies are often very low. For instance, Moon (1998) examined the occurrence of 
conventional multi-word units extracted from a dictionary of idioms in an 18 million-word 
corpus. She found that 70% of the units in her data set had a frequency of less 1 per million, 
and 40% did not occur at all in the corpus. The later included expressions such as hang fire, 
kick the bucket, speak for yourself, and one man's meat is another man's poison – which one 
could reasonably expect most native speakers to know. 
 Another striking feature of human memory is that it is content addressable, that is to 
say, we can retrieve a whole stored pattern when a part of the pattern is available as cue: for 
example, a semantic representation of a phrase can be used to retrieve the whole symbolic 
unit, or a part of a phrase can be used to retrieve the whole phrase.  As a result, retrieval is 
very efficient (we do not have to serially search through all our memories to retrieve a 
specific one, as most computers do), and retrieval speed is largely independent of the amount 
of the stored data (in fact, for domains that are richly interconnected, the more a person 
knows about the domain the better they are at encoding and retrieving information about it). 
 
4. The data 
 
So the idea that sentence production in adults, as in children, depends largely on 
retrieval of preconstructed chunks is perhaps not as outlandish as one might at first think. 
However, a researcher wishing to conduct a “traceback” analysis of a sample of adult 
utterances faces some practical problems. Adult speakers have experienced vast amounts of 
language. In ordinary conversation, speakers produce about 210 words per minute (Tauroza 
and Allison 1990). Assuming 6 hours of exposure to language per day, adult language users 
experience over half a million words (210×60×6×7=529,200) every week of their lives. Thus, 
to conduct a traceback analysis of adult speech, we need a vast corpus, ideally containing the 
speech of a single individual – and most large corpora consist mainly of written language, 
typically collected from many different users. In this respect, developmental corpora of child 
speech are rather unique in that they contain data from a small number of interlocutors 
recorded in informal, family settings. 
Note, however, that developmental corpora also contain adult speech – the speech 
addressed to the child who is the object of study. The largest developmental corpus currently 
available is the Thomas corpus collected by Lieven et al. (2009) and available from the 
CHILDES database (MacWhinney 2014). Thomas was recorded for five hours a week from 
age 2;0 to 3;0, and for one hour a week from 3;0 to 5;0. The corpus contains transcripts of 
379 hours of informal conversation. This includes 1,816,691 words produced by the mother 
(as well as 528,332 words produced by the child, and 164,689 words produced by other 
speakers). It is thus larger than any other sample of a single adult's conversational experience 
available. This corpus was therefore used in the analysis described here. The test corpus 
comprises a random sample of 100 multiword utterances produced by the mother (henceforth 
M) in the last recording, which was made when Thomas was 4;11.20. The main corpus 
comprises all the utterances in all preceding transcripts. 
Before we proceed, it is important to examine some of the properties of this corpus. It 
is well known that child-directed speech (CDS) differs from adult-directed speech in a 
number of respects: it is lexically less diverse, contains shorter, grammatically simpler 
utterances, is more repetitive, and tends deal with a more restricted range of topics (Cameron-
Faulkner et al. 2003; Newport et al. 1977; Snow 1986; Stoll et al. 2009). This raises an 
important question: can Thomas’ mother’s speech be regarded as a representative example of 
adult conversation? 
To address this point, we should first note that all the studies just mentioned 
investigated language addressed to children aged between one and three, whereas the test 
corpus which will be analyzed here comes from a recording made when Thomas was almost 
five. Furthermore, it if often asserted that grammatical development is complete by age four 
or fiveiii; and if four-year-olds know all there is know about (basic) grammar, then 
presumably adults’ speech to them does not differ grammatically from ordinary adult directed 
speech. Actually, however, children’s grammars continue to evolve until well into 
adolescence or even later, mainly a result of experience with written language (Berman 2004, 
2007; Hoffer 1994; Nippold 1998; Nippold et al. 2005). Thus, while language addressed to a 
five-year-old is likely to be more complex than that addressed to younger children, it could 
still be grammatically and/or lexically simpler than adult-adult conversation. To ensure that 
the sample analysed here is representative of ordinary adult speech, I conducted two analyses, 
one comparing the gammatical complexity and lexical diversity of the sample of M's speech 
with normative data for adults, and a second which directly compares it with samples of adult 
conversation. 
Nippold et al. (2005) have identified two measures which are particularly useful in 
measuring grammatical complexity in later stages of grammatical development: average 
length of speakers’ T-units (i.e., the main clause plus any subordinate clauses attached to it)  
and clausal density, or subordination index (the average number of clauses per T-unit). As 
shown in table 1, both of these measures increase slowly but steadily from age 8 until at least 
age 20. The mean length of T-unit in the mother's sample is 8.60 and its clausal density of 
1.30. This is slightly below the average figure for her age group (20+), but well within the 
range. 
To assess the lexical diversity of the mother's sample, I compared it with the findings 
reported in Johansson's (2008) study. The traditional measure of lexical diversity, the type-
token ratio (TTR), is known to be highly dependent on sample size, with larger samples 
giving considerably lower TTR values. For this reason, Johansson used a new measure called 
D, which has been shown to be more accurate  (MacWhinney 2014; Richards and Malvern 
1997). The mean value of D for adults in the Johansson study was 61.11 for narratives and 
81.12 for expository speech. (Unfortunately, Johansson does not provide information about 
the range or the standard deviation).  The corresponding figure for the mother (computed 
using the VOCD programme in CLAN) was 101.60 – well above the adult mean. 
  
Table 1: Mean length of T-unit (in words) and clausal density in conversation 
(Nippold et al. 2005) 
 
Age 
Length of T-unit Clausal density 
Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
8 6.74 0.86 4.42–8.44 1.18 0.09 1-1.37 
11 7.31 1.62 3.67–10.56 1.25 0.22 1-1.75 
13 6.88 0.93 5.56–8.52 1.17 0.09 1-1.42 
17 8.33 1.27 5.83–10.32 1.30 0.11 1.08-1.56 
25 9.86 2.08 6.00–13.44 1.39 0.21 1.08-1.82 
44 9.56 2.01 6.88–15.16 1.38 0.19 1.12-1.77 
 
 
 As a final test, I directly compared the mother's sample with transcripts of adult 
conversations taken from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (Du Bois et 
al. 2000-2005). Data from three transcripts, representing seven speakers, were used in the 
analysis. The transcripts were chosen to represent a range of different conversational 
situations: three friends, Marilyn, Roy and Pete, chatting while cooking a meal together 
(SBC005), a married couple (Darryl and Pamela) discussing the possibility of life after death 
(SBC003) and, as an example of task-based talk, two teenagers (Kathy and Nathan) going 
over a math test (SBC009). Samples of approximately 1100 words were extracted for each 
speaker. Table 2 below presents the results of the analysis using the two grammatical 
measures introduced above (mean length of T-unit and clausal density) and two measures of 
lexical diversity (TTR and D). As shown in the table, M's speech is indeed comparable to that 
of the other seven speakers. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the mother's sample with adult-adult conversations 
 
Speaker Clausal 
density 
Mean length of 
T-unit 
TTR D 
Kathy 1.20 6.78 0.22 59.88 
Nathan 1.34 5.43 0.27 69.35 
Darryl 1.37 7.71 0.39 90.71 
Pamela 1.41 7.68 0.36 91.67 
Marilyn 1.14 5.93 0.43 108.82 
Roy 1.30 7.70 0.41 113.14 
Pete 1.13 6.05 0.45 91.39 
Mean 1.27 6.75 0.36 89.23 
M 1.30 7.40 0.40 101.08 
 
I conclude, therefore, that the corpus can be regarded as a representative sample of 
adult conversational speech. Ideally, of course, one would use a suitably large sample of an 
adult speaker's conversations with other adults, but until such a corpus is available, we will 
have to make do with what we have. It should also be pointed out that the bulk of the main 
corpus (56%) contains transcripts of recordings made when Thomas was less than three years 
old, and is thus likely to contain less complex speech. This makes it more difficult to find 
lexically specific precedents for the mother’s utterances; thus, the structure of the corpus is 
actually biased against the hypothesis that adult speech can be explained in lexically-specific 
terms. 
 
5. Case study 
 
 This section describes a case study conducted in order to assess the role of 
preconstructed chunks in spontaneous adult production. The test corpus (i.e., the target 
utterances) comprises a random sample of 100 multiword utterances produced by M in the 
last recording, which was made when Thomas was 4;11.20. The target utterances were 
analysed using the same procedure as in the child study, with one exception: frames could 
contain up to two slots rather than just one, as in the child study. Examples of two-slot frames 
include the following: NP could do without NP ( instantiated by I could do without them, 
Thomas), remember TIME when S (e.g. remember before when I asked you if you'd enjoyed 
your lollipop from Marks+and+Spencers), and we have to VP and VP (e.g. we have to 
change direction and go over the bridge). 
 
5.1 General summary of the results 
 
Figure 5 provides information about the number of operations needed to construct the 
target utterances. As we can see, about a third of the utterances produced by M were zero or 
one operation utterances, i.e., either exact repetitions of a phrase attested at least twice in the 
main corpus, or utterances involving superimposition or juxtaposition of two previously 
attested units. Another third of the target utterances can be assembled by using two to four 
operations. Of the remaining utterances, 16 require 5-13 operations; 8 are lexical fails (that is 
to say, they contain a word which was not attested at least two times in the main corpus); and 
10 are syntactic fails. 
 
Figure 5: Number of operations needed to derive M’s utterances 
 The component units vary in length from 1 to 7 words. (For the purpose of this 
analysis, slots were counted as one word; contracted forms such as she’s and didn’t were also 
counted as single words). The frequency distribution of units of different length is shown in 
Figure 6. As we can see, the majority of multi-word units were relatively short (2-4 words). 
The frequency distribution is similar to that observed in Moon’s (1998) study of fixed 
expressions and idioms in English.iv 
 
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of component units of different length 
 
 Table 3 shows the frequency distributions of all units used in the traceback. (Note that 
the figures are for tokens, not types: thus, the frame and S was counted 7 times, since it 
occurred in seven different sentences.) The columns in the table correspond to different types 
of units. Columns 2 and 3 provide the figures for lexically specific units, i.e. single words 
without slots (book, ouch) and formulaic phrases (a nice cup of coffee). Columns 4 and 5 
provide the same information for formulaic frames; these are subdivided into words with 
slots (frames consisting of a single word and one or more slots, e.g. and S, terribly ADJ; note 
that traditionally such units would be considered single words) and phrases with slots (e.g. 
you won't VP, will you? I think it might be NP). Each row in the table represents a  single 
frequency band. For instance, the first row tells us that 20 of the 311 units used in derivations, 
i.e. 6% of the total, occurred only twice in the main corpus; of these, 1 was a single word, 4 
were fixed phrases, 1 was a word+slot(s) combination, and 14 were phrases with slots. 
 
Table 3: Frequency distribution of all units used in the traceback analysis 
 
 
Frequency Single 
words 
Fixed 
phrases 
Words w/ 
slot(s) 
Phrases 
w/ slot(s) 
Total % total 
units 
2 1 4 1 14 20 6 
3 0 5 1 9 15 5 
4 2 7 1 13 23 7 
5 4 5 1 3 13 4 
6 1 4 0 5 10 3 
7 1 3 1 5 10 3 
8 0 2 0 4 6 2 
9 1 2 2 4 9 3 
10 1 0 2 2 5 2 
11-20 3 9 3 14 29 9 
21-30 5 6 0 8 19 6 
31-40 1 6 0 6 13 4 
41-50 4 1 0 5 10 3 
50+ 24 31 29 45 129 41 
Total 48 85 41 137 311 100 
% total 15 27 13 44 100  
  
 
 There are several observations that one might make about these figures. First, most of 
the units used in the derivation are phrasal: fixed phrases and phrases with slots together 
account for 71% of all units. Secondly, the lower frequency bands (2-10) contain more 
phrasal units than single words with or without slots. This is not surprising, since individual 
words typically occur in a number of different phrases. Thirdly, the majority of the units are 
are relatively frequent: only 23% have a frequency between 2 and 5, and a relatively large 
proportion (41%) were very frequent, i.e., attested 50 times or more in the main corpus. This 
will be important in Section 5.4, where we discuss the implications of using different 
frequency thresholds for identifying ready-made units. Finally, we may note that invariant 
units (fixed phrases and single words) account for 42% of the units and one-slot frames for 
48%. Only 8% of the component units are two-slot frames. 
 One of the purposes of the analysis conducted here was to investigate the processing 
advantages of using prefabricated chunks. Researchers studying formulaic language generally 
assume that retrieving an item from memory is computationally less demanding than 
assembling it from minimal components – but just how much processing effort is saved? We 
can obtain a rough estimate by comparing the number of operations required to assemble the 
target utterances using larger chunks identified in the main corpus with the number of 
operations necessary to assemble the same utterances “from scratch”, that is, using chunks 
consisting of single lexical items. The mean length of the utterances analysed here was 7.4 
words; the average number of operations per utterance was 2.3. A seven-word utterance 
assembled “from scratch” requires six operations and an eight-word utterance, seven 
operations. Thus, using chunks could save the speaker/listener about two-thirds of the 
processing effort. 
It must be stressed that the above estimate is a very rough calculation based on 
simplifying assumptions which could be incorrect. It assumes that all chunks are equally easy 
to process, which may or may not be the case. Dąbrowska and Lieven (2005) argued that 
language learners prefer larger chunks, since the overlapping parts make it easier to see how 
they should be put together: unifying such chunks is thus similar to completing a jigsaw 
puzzle in which each piece has a picture of part of the adjacent piece attached to it. It could 
be argued, however, that larger chunks are more difficult to retrieve and manipulate. It is also 
likely that chunk frequency plays a role, in that more frequent and hence more entrenched 
chunks presumably incur a lower processing cost; the above estimate, however, does not 
make allowances for this (On the other hand, as discussed in Section 5 below, smaller chunks 
may act as retrieval cues for larger ones, which may partially offset the difficulty of 
manipulating larger chunks.) Secondly, the estimate given above assumes that juxtaposition 
and superimposition involve the same amount of effort. However, it could be argued that 
superimposition is more effortful because it requires attention to the internal structure of 
chunks and lining up corresponding elements, while juxtaposition does not  require any such 
processes. Thus, the figure given in the preceding paragraph must be treated with some 
caution; it does, however, give us a sense of how much processing effort we could potentially 
save by using larger chunks. 
 
5.2 Some examples 
 
To give the reader a sense of how the adult traceback works in practice, I show how 
four fairly complex utterances can be derived by juxtaposing and superimposing chunks. I 
then provide a full list of all the “fails” (i.e., utterances which could not be derived from 
lexically specific units attested in the main corpus) and discuss them briefly. 
 
5.2.1. Example 1: The cover for the box is still there it’s still in the box look. 
 
Example 1 consists of three clauses: (1) the cover for the box is still there, (2) it’s still in the 
box and (3) look juxtaposed to form a single utterance.v The first clause can be assembled by 
superimposing the cover for the N and the box, which yields the cover for the box; this, in 
turn, can be superimposed over the NP slot in the frame NP is still there. The other two 
clauses are assumed to be available as units. Thus, the target utterance by combining the five 
chunks: 
NP is still there (3) 
the cover for the N (2) 
the box (50+) 
it’s still in the box (2) 
look (50+) 
and requires four operations. (The numbers in parentheses indicate corpus frequency; 50+ 
means that the chunk occurred more than 50 times.) 
 This analysis assumes that any chunk with a corpus frequency of two or more is 
available as a ready-made unit. Is this a realistic assumption? It is important to bear in mind 
that the transcripts available in the corpus constitute about 0.26% of M’s linguistic 
experience.vi Thus, the average frequency of lexical chunks with a corpus frequency X in M’s 
experience is roughly 385 times X. In other words, if we had to estimate how often she 
experienced the chunks the cover for the N and it’s still in the box, our best guess would be 
770 times. Given that the Gurevich et al. study described earlier demonstrated some verbatim 
memory for sentences after a single exposure, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that a 
chunk which had been experienced 770 times is available as a preconstructed unit. 
 Of course, we have no way of knowing for sure how many times M had encountered a 
particular lexically specific unit: the two recorded tokens may have been the only two she 
ever experienced, and we were just lucky to catch them in the recording. It is important to 
note, therefore, that nothing crucial hinges on the use of the specific chunks enumerated 
earlier. If we raise the frequency threshold to 3, the cover for the N and it’s still in the box are 
no longer available as preassembled units, but the target utterance can be assembled using 
different chunks: cover for NP (which is attested 7 times in the corpus) and it’s still in the N 
(attested 4 times). If the frequency threshold is raised to 4, NP is still there is no longer 
available and we have to use the two-slot frame NP is still LOC, which is attested 8 times; 
and so on. Thus, as the frequency threshold is raised, more abstract units must be used, which 
results in more complex derivations; however, the target can still be assembled. 
 5.2.2. Example 2: I don’t think we really need a train track, do you? 
 
Note that in this utterance, the pronoun in the main clause doesn’t match the pronoun in the 
tag. Thus, the utterance could not be derived using traditional tag rules. However, the frame I 
don’t think S do you? is well attested in the corpus (117 tokens), and the target utterance can 
be easily assembled by combing this frame with two other lexically specific units: I don’t 
think we really need NP (attested twice) and a train track (attested 29 times). If we raise the 
frequency threshold, I don’t think we really need NP is no longer available and the target 
utterance will have to be constructed using more frequent chunks: either we really need NP 
(attested 3 times) or NP really need NP (attested 7 times). 
 
5.2.3. Example 3: You’re not going to tell me what happened when you went to Luke’s house, 
Thomas. 
 
This quite complex utterance can be assembled in 4 steps using the following chunks: 
 
you’re not going to VP (91) 
tell me what happened when S (3) 
when you went to POSS house (4) 
Luke’s N (7) 
Thomas (50+) 
 
Again, there are various alternative derivations. Let us consider just one part of this utterance: 
the subordinate clause when you went to Luke’s house. The simplest derivation involves 
superimposing two complex frames, when you went to POSS house + Luke’s N. However, 
there are a number of other possibilities. These include the following (among others): 
 
when S (50+) + you went to POSS house (7) + Luke’s N (7) 
when S (50+) + you VP (50+) + NP went to POSS house (45) + Luke’s N (7) 
when S (50+) + you went to NP (50+) + POSS house (50+)+ Luke’s N (7) 
when you went DIR (41) + to NP’s house (50+) + Luke (50+) 
when NP went to NP’s house (16) + you VP (50+) + Luke (50+) 
 
 
5.2.4. Example 4: It was quite annoying really because you thought oh great I’ve found ten 
pee but there was no way you could lift it up. 
 
All of the examples considered so far were relatively simple derivations involving 2-4 
operations. In this final example, we consider an utterance which was somewhat problematic, 
requiring 12 operations. (Another target utterance contained a long list of nouns and required 
13 operations. However, it was not syntactically interesting and will not be discussed further.) 
The utterance can be assembled by juxtaposing and superimposing the following chunks: 
 
It was AP because S (8) 
(NP BE) quite AP really (11) 
annoying (15) 
because you thought S (7) 
(NP thought) oh EXCL S (4) 
great (50+) 
I’ve found NP (49) 
ten pee (3) 
but S (50+) 
there BE no way S (4) 
there was NP (50+) 
you could VP (50+) 
lift it up (50+) 
 
Although the derivation is quite complex, it is worth observing that using preconstructed 
chunks still saves half of the processing effort: if the utterance had been assembled from 
word-sized units, the derivation would involve 24 steps. 
 
5.3 Unsuccessful derivations (“fails”) 
 
 Eighteen of the target sentences could not be derived from lexically specific units; a 
complete list of these is given in Table 4, with the problematic parts printed in bold. The first 
eight of these “fails” are purely lexical: that is to say, one of the words used in the utterance 
was not attested in the relevant sense, or at all, in the corpus, or it was attested only once and 
hence did not meet the frequency criterion. As can be seen from the table, all of these are 
perfectly conventional uses of ordinary English words such as stroke, explosion, or ease, and 
we can be confident that M has both heard and used these words many times before; the fact 
that they are not attested in the main corpus is simply an accident of sampling (recall that the 
sample only contains approximately 0.26% of her linguistic experience). But this figure puts 
the syntactic fails in perspective: the fact that there is no lexically specific match for a 
particular part of the target utterance may mean that it is produced using more general rules – 
but it could also have been produced using lexically specific units which just happen not to be 
represented in the main corpus. 
 The remaining ten utterances are classified as syntactic fails. In three of them (9, 10 
and 11), verbs which were only attested in a transitive frame in the main corpus are used 
intransitively, or vice versa; hence, although the problem is syntactic in the sense that it 
involves combinatorial properties, it is also lexical in the sense that the properties are 
associated with specific verbs. Sentence 12 is problematic because of the expression on her 
mobile phone. The nearest matches for this are on the phone and on the telephone, with no 
variation in the determiner slot. The sentence could be derived if we relaxed the variation 
criterion for frames with slots, which requires the frame be attested with at least two different 
fillers. The next two sentences, 13 and 14, involve slightly idiomatic uses which could be 
accommodated if we allowed for three-slot frames. The remaining four involve more 
complex sentences with a non-finite subordinate clause (15), a cleft (16), and relative clauses 
(17 and 18). Some of these could be accommodated if we assumed more abstract frames (e.g. 
what NP MODAL do TIME is VP for 16), but this seems to be stretching the definition of a 
lexically specific unit too far. The relative clauses are particularly problematic since they 
require substitution of a filler containing a gap – although in principle such constructions can 
be accommodated in terms of lexically specific templates (see Dąbrowska 2008a). 
 To summarize: the “traceback” method developed by Dąbrowska and Lieven (2005) 
worked very well for over 80% of M’s utterances. Of the eighteen “fails”, eleven involve 
specific properties of individual words, and three could be accommodated if the criteria for 
formulaic frames were slightly relaxed. The remaining four are more problematic and may 
constitute evidence for more abstract knowledge. 
 
Table 4: Unsuccessful derivations 
 
Utterance Reason for fail 
1. Thomas don’t fib come on I 
haven’t time. 
only 1 token of fib as a verb in the main 
corpus 
2. but not for quite a few because he’s 
had a stroke now. 
only 1 token of stroke (in the relevant sense) 
in the main corpus 
3. can you not have a quiet 
explosion? 
only 1 token of explosion in the main corpus 
4. do you know what that nice music 
support [?] is? 
only 1 token of support in the main corpus 
5. I said that’s a new one on me. no occurrences of on in the relevant sense in 
the main corpus 
6. something explodes and you can’t 
sort of plan when it’s going to 
happen. 
no tokens of plan as verb in the main corpus 
7. that’s it gently ease it out. only one token of ease as verb in the main 
corpus 
8. tracks and explosions and trees 
falling down. 
only 1 token of explosion in the main corpus 
9. Thomas please if you do that I’m 
stopping playing. 
stopping only used in intransitive frames in 
main corpus 
10. well I wasn’t lifting I was helping 
you into your chair I thought I felt 
something. 
lift used only in transitive frames in main 
corpus 
11. well don’t tease today Thomas ,, 
will you … 
tease used only in transitive frames in main 
corpus 
12. I think she’s obviously talking to 
someone on her mobile+phone ,, 
isn’t she? 
the only matches are on the telephone, on the 
phone; no variation in the determiner slot 
13. and somebody else is with us. requires a 3-slot frame (PERSON BE with 
PERSON) or matching with us with 
LOCATION in NP is LOCATION 
14. what’s the problem why is there 
a caution sign up? 
requires a 3-slot frame (why BE there NP 
LOC) 
15. … and the police+helicopter just 
stayed above shining a light for 
them. 
no match for gerundive clause 
16. what we’ll do after lunch is 
brush your teeth. 
requires a frame with four slots 
(what NP MODAL do TIME is VP) 
17. and the number of people I used 
to see going to pick up that ten pee. 
no match for relative clause 
18. it’s just a model that somebody 
didn’t want. 
no match for relative clause 
 
 
5.4  Changing the frequency threshold 
 
 The analysis presented above assumed that units attested at least twice in the main 
corpus were available to M as ready-made chunks. This frequency threshold is admittedly 
arbitrary, and the reader may well wonder whether it is psychologically realistic. As argued 
earlier (see Section 5.2.1) the true frequency of most of these chunks in M's linguistic 
experience is likely to be considerably higher, but for any specific chunk, it is possible that 
the two occurrences attested in the corpus are the only tokens she had experienced. It is 
important, therefore, to determine to what extent the results of the traceback depend on the 
frequency assumption: in other words, how they would change if we assumed a higher 
frequency threshold, for instance 3, 4 or 5. 
 First, let us consider what happens when we raise the frequency threshold to 3. As 
shown in Table 3, there are 20 units with a frequency of 2 in the main corpus. These were 
used in the derivation of 16 utterances (4 derivations involved two units with a frequency of 
2). Thus, 16 target utterances will be affected if the frequency is raised to 3. Of these, 5 can 
be derived using the same number of operations but smaller (and hence more frequent) 
chunks; 9 can be derived but require an additional operation; and 2 are lexical fails. Both of 
the latter involve proper names (Lucy and Oxford). There are no syntactic fails. 
 If we raise the minimum frequency threshold from 3 to 4, 13 sentences are affected. 
Of these, 1 requires the same number of operations with smaller chunks, 8 require one 
additional operation, and 4 requires two additional operations. There are no additional fails. 
 Finally, if we raise the minimum frequency threshold from 4 to 5, 19 sentences are 
affected. Of these, 4 require the same number of operations, 12 involve one additional 
operation, 1 is a lexical fail involving the relatively infrequent word clatter, and 2 are 
syntactic fails. The syntactic fails include a sentence containing a passive  with an oblique 
prepositional phrase (there it's attached to the other end of the train+track) and a 
nominalized verb followed by a 'dangling' preposition (what did you have a play with at 
Luke's house?) – both somewhat unusual structures. 
 
Table 5: Traceback results under different frequency thresholds 
 
 
Derviation result 
Frequency threshold 
2 3 4 5 
Successful 82 80 80 77 
Lexical fail 8 10 10 11 
Syntactic fail 10 10 10 12 
 
 
 The overall results of these additional analyses are summarized in Table 5. Clearly, if 
we continue raising the frequency threshold, more derivations will fail, until eventually we 
will reach a point where no sentence will be derivable from units attested in the main corpus. 
However, the slope of the curve corresponding to the increase in fails is very gentle. This is 
because, as we have seen earlier, most of the component units used in the derivation are quite 
frequent. Perhaps surprisingly, raising the main corpus frequency threshold has very little 
effect on the final outcome: typically, the target sentences can still be derived from the 
component units, but may require additional operations. Note, too, that, in spite of the fact 
that most of the low frequency units are phrasal, raising the frequency threshold is equally 
likely to lead to a lexical fail or to a syntactic fail. 
 
6. How adults build sentences 
  
 I have argued that ordinary language use, whether by adults or by children, involves 
“recycling” fragments of utterances by superimposition and juxtapositior, or what Tomasello 
(2000: 74) calls “cut-and-paste”. It is important to emphasize that constructing novel 
utterances by combining chunks requires grammatical knowledge. To be able to produce 
well-formed utterances using this method, speakers must know which chunk of form 
corresponds to which chunk of meaning (i.e., have some understanding of constituency), and 
they must know which slots can be filled by which items (i.e., they must have some notion of 
grammatical categories such NP, VP, and VP, as well as more specific subcategories like 
“verb phrase with bare verb”, “gerundive verb phrase”, “verb phrase headed by past 
participle”). However, this kind of knowledge is rather different in kind from the abstract 
rules that, according to most linguists, are necessary to explain our linguistic productivity. 
Note, too, that the knowledge required for recycling can be construction specific. It is 
conceivable, for instance, that a particular speaker has passive constructions which apply to 
specific verbs (e.g. NP1 is based on NP2, NP1 was known to NP2, but not a verb-general 
passive construction (NP1 was VERBed by NP2). Categories, too, can be construction-
specific, e.g. in the SOUND of the N construction, the first slot can be filled either by a noun 
designating sound (sound, noise) or by an onomatopoeic expression (chuff@o, 
drip+drip@o), while the second slot can be filled with any noun referring to a source of 
sound (e.g. lorry, train, tap, etc.) 
Most earlier work on holistic processing regards it as a special mode, something that 
people use to complement the normal (i.e. analytic) mode (but see Sinclair 1991). My claim 
here is that recycling chunks is the basic mode of sentence production – what people 
normally do. Is this all there is to knowing a language? Almost certainly not. There is 
evidence that adults – particularly adults in societies with compulsory schooling and a long 
tradition of literacy – also have more abstract knowledge. As we have seen, some structures 
(for instance, relative clauses and some kinds of non-finite clauses) are difficult to 
accommodate in a lexically specific framework and may require more abstract 
representations. Note, however, that such structures are most typical of written language, not 
informal conversation. The basic “recycling” mode can be complemented by a more analytic 
mode; the latter, however, places much higher demands on the processing system and may be 
a product of formal schooling (Givón 1998; Iwasaki under review; Perfetti and McCutchen 
1987; Wray and Grace 2007). 
 In fact, it may be possible to avoid the analytic mode altogether by applying analogy 
when no suitable lexically-specific schema is available. Dąbrowska (2008a) argues that 
English speakers have two lexically specific formulaic frames for questions with long 
distance dependencies: WH do you think S-GAP? and WH did you say S-GAP?, and that they 
produce “prototypical” questions with long-distance dependencies, i.e., questions that match 
one of these templates, by inserting a WH word into the first slot and a clause with a missing 
constituent into the second slot, and modifying the template (e.g. by changing the verb or the 
subject) when they want to produce questions such as What do you believe he said? or What 
did he say she wanted? If we accept this view, then the “analytic” mode may be analogous to 
what Moon (1998) calls “exploitations” of idioms such as throw in the moist towelette or use 
an earthmover to crack a nut (modelled on throw in the towel and use a sledgehammer to 
crack a nut, respectively). 
  What, then, would a lexically specific usage-based account of language production 
look like? I have argued that speakers possess vast inventories of fixed phrases and formulaic 
frames (and possibly some more general constructions as well) stored in a richly 
interconnected associative network. During production, they retrieve the constructions which 
partially match their communicative intentions and combine them by juxtaposing or 
superimposing them as appropriate. It is likely that speakers often retrieve more units than 
they actually need to construct their utterance, and so several different verbalizations of the 
message may be assembled in parallel. Normally, the verbalization which is completed first 
would be produced, although in some circumstances a speaker may reject it in favour of an 
alternative verbalization. I also assume that regular combinations are available as units if they 
are frequent enough. We do not know how frequent a complex expression must be in order to 
be available as a preconstructed unit, and it is likely that there is a trade-off between 
frequency and specificity: more frequent units may be more entrenched and hence easier to 
retrieve, but larger units show more overlap with the speakers’ communicative intentions and 
result in simpler derivations. It is possible that different speakers resolve this conflict in 
different ways: some may prefer larger, more concrete units (and produce fluent though 
stereotypical utterances) while others may rely on smaller chunks. The degree to which a 
speaker relies on relatively large, concrete units also depends to a certain extent on the 
situation and/or topic: speakers may be very fluent in situations for which they have a large 
repertoire of phrases, and much less fluent in other contexts. This is nicely illustrated by 
Kuiper’s (1996) study of abnormally fluent speakers such as auctioneers and fast sport 
commentators, as well as the common observation that bilinguals who are used to speaking 
different languages in different contexts may become surprisingly disfluent when required to 
use one of their languages in the “wrong” setting. 
 Note that the account proposed here differs from the traditional view which assumes 
that chunks are stored as unanalysed units. While this may be the case for some chunks, I 
propose that most chunks are analysed into their components. This is a precondition for our 
ability to recombine units to produce novel utterances, and it also ensures more efficient 
storage. Thus, the fact that at the end of the day is available as a unit does not prevent the 
language user from perceiving, and being able to access, the smaller chunks that make it up, 
including individual words (at, the, end, etc.), as well as intermediate-sized chunks such as 
the end, the end of NP, the day, and so on. This is a consequence of the way that memory 
works. When we commit something to memory –  be it of a scene we have observed or an 
utterance we have heard  – we extract key elements from the experience and encode them, 
with different parts of the experience stored separately in different parts of the brain. When 
we subsequently recall the experience, we access the components and reconstruct the 
memory rather than retrieving copies of the original experience (Fernyhough 2012; Fuster 
1999). 
 Thus, I suggest that chunks of various sizes co-exist, not as distinct units, but as 
partially overlapping representations which may be thought of as a family of units whose 
members reinforce each other. A language user can access any of the subchunks 
independently, but can also use the smaller, more frequent chunks as retrieval cues for larger 
ones: in other words, a large and relatively infrequent unit such as at the end of the day may 
be accessed by activating the semantic units corresponding to END and DAY, which in turn 
activate their phonological representations and the larger symbolic unit of which they are 
both a part. 
 The “recycling” account of syntactic productivity proposed here has some similarities 
with lexically-based models of grammatical encoding such as Levelt's (1989) and especially 
the more recent approach developed by Ferreira (2000), in which individual lexical items are 
thought to include elementary trees which can be unified by substitution or adjoining. It 
differs from such models in two important ways. First, it is based on a cognitive linguistic 
framework which treats words as mini-constructions (cf. Dąbrowska 2009) rather than 
assuming autonomous syntactic representations. Secondly, drawing on the extensive literature 
on multiword chunks, it proposes the units that are combined are typically larger than simple 
lexical items. 
 In this respect, the recycling model resembles “Data-Oriented Parsing” (DOP),  a 
computational approach developed by Rens Bod and his colleagues (Scha et al. 1999; Bod 
2006, 2009). Like the approach outlined here, DOP is based on the principle that people store 
analyzed fragments of previously encountered sentences and recombine these fragments to 
produce novel sentences; however, since the stored fragments are parse trees, it assumes 
autonomous syntactic representations. In order to explain acquisition, DOP also makes 
another psychologically implausible assumption, namely, that the learner initially allows for 
all possible trees for a given sentence and decides on which one is correct on the basis of 
experience (Bod 2006, 2009). Since the number of possible trees grows exponentially with 
sentence length, it is difficult to see how this approach would avoid a computational 
explosion. The great advantage of DOP, on the other hand, is the fact that it is 
computationally implemented, thus making it relatively easy to test the effects of various 
assumptions. 
 Experiments with DOP have produced some interesting results which are very 
relevant to the proposal developed here. Scha et al. (1999) report that using larger, and in 
particular, overlapping fragments leads to better performance, although the returns are 
diminishing: thus while increasing fragment size from 1 to 2 and from 2 to 3 items results in a 
considerable increase in the model's accuracy, further increases result in only modest 
improvements, and there is no improvement for chunks of more than 6 items. (It is interesting 
to note in this connection that most of the chunks that were actually used in the traceback 
were 2-3 words long, and chunks of more than 6 words were extremely rare.) Furthermore, 
Scha et al. found that using lexically specific fragments also resulted in better performance – 
although again, only up to a point, with accuracy actually deteriorating when fragments were 
more than 8 words long – and that the use of low frequency fragments improved accuracy 
(primarily because low-frequency fragments tend to be large and lexically specific). 
 The “recycling” model outlined here provides a simple and psychologically plausible 
account of language production in informal conversation in English, a language with a 
relatively fixed word order. Could it also be applied to languages with a richer morphology 
and more variable word order? It is safe to assume that speakers of such languages store fixed 
phrases as well as some frames with slots: very few, if any, languages have no restrictions on 
word order at all, so some frames will be needed to explain constructions with fixed word 
order. However, to explain constructions which allow variable word order, we need a new 
type of unit, which I will call a packet: a multi-word unit which does not specify the order of 
the components. Thus, while an English transitive verb is a frame with two slots (NP1 > verb 
> NP2), a transitive verb in a relatively free word order language such as Polish would be a 
packet consisting of a verb and two nominals (verb, NP1, NP2): note that I am using they 
symbol '>' to indicate ordering and the comma to indicate lack of ordering. The units 
contained in a packet would be juxtaposed when the sentence is actually produced. Statistical 
preferences for certain word orders would be explained partly by more general word order 
constructions and partly by processing constraints: for instance, the fact that speakers tend to 
produce the most accessible elements first in order to free working memory (Ferreira and 
Engelhardt 2006) can explain the preference for ordering given information before new. 
 As indicated earlier, phrase recycling can easily accommodate grammatical 
relationships such as government and agreement if we assume that words are partially 
schematic constructions: for instance, superimposing (NP) eat NP and V them (rather than 
just the simple pronoun) ensures that the appropriate form of the pronoun appears after the 
verb; superimposing a schematic nominal construction (two N-PL) and a plural noun (>1 
mice) ensures agreement between the nominal and the noun, and so on. In languages where 
the grammatical relationship is signaled on the dependent word, the larger construction will 
specifify details of dependent marking. For instance, in Polish, the object of a negated verb is 
marked by the genitive case:   
(4) Nie  ma           soku. 
 not  have:3SG juice:GEN:SG 
 'There isn't any juice.' 
 
Assuming that the packet [nie ma, N-u] 'there isn't any N' and the lexically specific unit sok-u 
'juice:GEN' are available to the speaker as chunks, sentence (4) would be assembled by 
juxtaposing the component units of the packet and superimposing sok-u and (nie ma) N-u. 
Clearly, a detailed analysis will be necessary to determine whether such a method would 
actually work; hopefully, however, this brief discussion demonstrates how it could work in 
principle. 
 
7. Beyond productivity 
 
 The account outlined above raises some interesting questions. If different speakers 
have different lexically specific chunks, how can they understand each other? And in what 
sense can they be said to speak the same language? Last but not least, languages are not just 
collections of chunks: they contain numerous regularities. Where do these regularities come 
from? 
As we saw earlier, the same utterances can be assembled using different chunks; thus 
the fact different speakers store different lexically specific units is not necessarily a problem 
for this account. (Morevoer, even the same speaker may assemble the same utterance using 
different chunks on different occasions, depending on, for example, which units have been 
primed by prior discourse. This flexibility helps to explain the speed of language processing: 
we save time by opportunistically using whichever chunks are most accessible at the time of 
the speech event.) Note, too, that speakers don’t need to share exactly the same grammar to 
be able communicate. Human beings are very good at using whatever information is available 
to infer other people’s communicative intentions: indeed this is what makes language 
acquisition possible in the first place (Tomasello 2008). Furthermore, as Ferreira et al. (2002) 
note, in most casual conversations, a very superficial analysis of the linguistic form is “good 
enough” for successful communication (see also Dąbrowska 2004, chapter 2). 
Secondly, in what sense can speakers with (possibly very) different inventories of 
lexically specific chunks be said to “speak the same language”? The obvious answer is that 
chunks are shared by speakers, although they need not be shared by all speakers. An analogy 
with vocabulary may be helpful here. Vocabulary is shared, in the sense that (presumably) 
every English speaker knows words like good, boy, or sleep; many speakers also know words 
like bawdy, trudge, or ubiquitous; however, very few have productive knowledge of words 
like corpuscle or dunnart – and yet all of these words are considered part of the language. 
Complex units are shared in the same way. Highly frequent units such as those in (5) are 
shared by (nearly) everyone, while less frequent units are shared by only a few speakers. 
Languages belong to communities, not to individual speakers: an individual speaker “owns” 
only a part of his or her language. 
(5) I don’t think so. (359) 
I don’t believe a word of it. (78) 
I haven’t seen you for ages. (101) 
Who do you think you are? (531) 
What’s a nice girl like you doing in a place like this? (157)1 
  
 Language is also shared in a different sense. Every time a speaker produces an 
utterance and the listener understands his or her communicative intentions, that particular 
form-meaning pairing is shared by them, at least momentarily. In other words, every 
successful act of communication is an act of sharing linguistic expressions, and any linguistic 
device that contributed to communicative success is reinforced. As Millikan (2008) argues, a 
linguistic convention will survive if it succeeds in coordinating speaker-hearer 
communicative intentions some critical proportion of the time: it doesn't have to be all of the 
time, or even most of the time. 
Finally, why are languages as regular as they are? Before we address this question, it 
is perhaps worth noting that modern linguistics has tended to overemphasize the systematic 
nature of language, and overlook the idiosyncrasies. It is undeniable that languages exhibit 
many regularities – but they are also shot through with irregularities: as Sapir famously 
observed, “all grammars leak” (1921: 39). Furthermore, standard varieties of modern 
                                                          
1
 The numbers in parentheses indicate WebCorp frequencies. The search was carried out on 2 
March 2013). 
“exoteric” languages, which are the subject of the most intensive linguistic enquiry, are 
products of a long history of schooling and language planning, and thus tend to be more 
regular than languages in their “natural” state (see Wray and Grace 2007). 
The traditional explanation for systematicity is that all languages are highly 
constrained by an innate Universal Grammar, or alternatively, that speakers prefer more 
general rules. As I argue elsewhere (Dąbrowska 2010, under review), neither of these 
explanations is very satisfactory. An alternative account is provided by functionalist studies 
which demonstrate that many patterns in language arise as a result of processing demands 
(Hawkins 2004; Jaeger and Tily 2011; MacDonald 2013), communicative pressures having to 
do with economy, i.e., concise representation of frequent concepts (Bybee 2010; Haspelmath 
2008, 2014; Jaeger and Tily 2011) on the one hand, and avoiding ambiguity (Gibson et al. 2013) 
on the other, as well as a variety of other discourse and cognitive pressures (Ariel 2009, Du Bois 
2003; Givón 2009). Such pressures can be quite weak: all they have to do is increase the 
frequency of one variant slightly. Once this has occurred, frequency itself will tend to amplify 
the pattern, since more entrenched patterns are easier to access and hence preferred by 
speakers, which results in even greater frequency, and so on. Finally, regular patterns can 
arise as a result of intergenerational transmission. This is nicely demonstrated by a series of 
experiments on “iterated learning” in which speakers are exposed to a set of form-meaning 
pairings and subsequently produce them; their output serves as input for the next 
“generation” of participants, who in turn provide input for the next group, and so on (see 
Cornish et al. 2009; Scott-Phillips and Kirby 2010). The form-meaning pairings are initially 
random, but gradually evolve into a system. Crucially, this happens not because learners 
necessarily have a preference for more regular mappings, but simply as a result of the fact 
that each learner is exposed to only a subset of the possible form-meaning pairings: 
 
Over time, iterated learning ensures languages evolve to (a) become easier to learn 
and (b) become more structured….. This is because there are only two ways to 
survive the transmission bottleneck: be heard (and remembered) by the next 
generation or be easily inferable from what is heard. This latter solution can only 
occur when there is some kind of regularity to be exploited in the system. (Cornish et 
al. 2009: 188-189) 
 
Traditionally, linguists have assumed that speakers of the same language variety share 
the same grammar, and that speakers’ grammars are the same as linguists’ grammars. There is 
growing evidence that this is not the case: unlike linguists, speakers appear to have a 
preference for low-level local schemas rather than general rules which apply “across the 
board” (Dąbrowska 2010), and there are substantial differences between individual speakers’ 
grammars (Dąbrowska 2012). However, speakers attempt to approximate each other’s 
behaviour, and thus community grammars appear to be more regular than individual 
grammars (Dąbrowska 2008b, 2013; Hurford 2000). It follows that there are regularities in 
language which are not explicitly represented in speakers’ minds (or at least not all speakers’ 
minds). To understand how such regularities arise, we must learn to think of language as 
complexity theory sees it: as a complex, multi-agent, dynamic and adaptive system where 
regularities emerge from interactions between speakers (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008) 
and are best viewed as central tendencies in a massive collection of previously experienced 
utterances (Ellis and Larsen-Freeman 2006). 
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Figure 1: Types of complex units 
(a) a formulaic (fixed) phrase  
(b) a low level schema (“frame with slots”) 
(c) a general schema (“abstract construction”) 
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Figure 2: The superimposition of where's the N and pteranodon  
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Figure 3: Superimposition of get them AP and get AP ready 
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Figure 4: Derivation of Squirrel, do you want to buy some milk? 
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Figure 5: Number of operations needed to derive M’s utterances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of component units of different length 
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i
 Pollack and Pickett (1964) spliced single words out of a recorded conversation and played 
them to new participants. Only about 50% of the words were intelligible when presented in 
isolation. 
ii
 The expression I like it occurs 389 times in the BNC, and thus is comparable to polysyllabic 
words such as rectangle (304 tokens in BNC), erratic (392 tokens) or hideous (423 tokens). 
iii
 Consider, for example, the following statements:   
 
It is safe to say that except for constructions that are rare, predominantly used in 
written language, or mentally taxing even to an adult (like The horse that the elephant 
tickled kissed the pig), all parts of all languages are acquired before the child turns 
four. (Pinker 1995) 
 
By age 5, children essentially master the sound system and grammar of their language 
and acquire a vocabulary of thousands of words…. The development of complex (i.e., 
multi-clause) sentences usually begins some time before the child’s second birthday 
and is largely complete by age 4. (Hoff 2009) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
It is well known, however, that children acquire most of their grammar by the time 
they are three years old. (Hirsch Pasek & Golinkoff 1996: 2) 
iv
 Note that Moon investigated only non-compositional expressions. 
v
 One may ask whether this is indeed a single utterance or two, or perhaps even three. Spoken 
language researchers use a variety of criteria (e.g. pauses, intonation, syntactic integrity) to 
identify utterances – but these are often in conflict. Since CHAT (the transcription 
conventions employed in the CHILDES database) requires that each utterance be transcribed 
on a single line, for the purposes of this analysis, it was assumed that each line constituted a 
single utterance: in other words, I simply followed the intuitions of the original transcriber. 
Note that dividing such doubtful cases into shorter utterances would result in simpler 
derivations. 
vi
 As explained earlier, in normal adult conversation about 210 words are spoken per minute. 
If the mother is 25 years old and was exposed to language for 6 hours a day all her life, her 
total linguistic experience comprises 689,850,000 words (210 × 60 × 6 × 365 × 25). 
